The reduction of qualitative games by Patriche, Monica
ar
X
iv
:1
30
3.
69
76
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
7 M
ar 
20
13
The reduction of qualitative games
Monica Patriche
University of Bucharest Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science
14 Academiei Street
010014 Bucharest, Romania
monica.patriche@yahoo.com
Abstract
We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also
in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of rationalizable result. We
define several types of dominance relation and game reduction and establish
conditions under which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists.
We generalize, in this way, some results due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman
(2002) and Apt (2007).
Keywords: dominance relation, iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies, maximal reduction of a game, qualitative games.
1. INTRODUCTION
Bernheim [3] and Pearce [16] studied the rationalizable strategic behavior
in the framework of non-cooperative strategic games introduced by Nash [14].
The rational behavior of the players is a fundamental assumption in Game
theory. It implies that each strategic game can be characterized by a process
of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). The result
of this process is known as the maximal reduction of the game.
The iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies has several dif-
ferent definitions. We must refer to the approaches of Gilboa, Kalai and
Zemel [9,10], Milgrom and Roberts [13], Marx and Swinkels [12], Ritzberger
[17], Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8], Chen, Long and Luo [5], or Apt [1,2]
as some important ones in the literature. Osborne and Rubinstein [15] and
Rubinstein [18] also developed some topics concerning rationality.
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The main problems concerning the IESDS procedure are related to the
non-emptiness and uniqueness of the limit game. In the case of infinite
games, the order of reductions is important, and the maximal reduction may
not be unique if different paths are considered. Dufwenberg and Stegeman
[8] proved the uniqueness and nonemptiness of the maximal reduction for a
strategic game with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions.
Apt [1] treated the various definitions of IESDS in a unitary way, specifying
the games where the definitions coincide. His approach is based on complete
lattice and the study of operators.
In order to develop the ideas concerning the rationality, we consider a
model which generalizes the strategic game. We consider the qualitative
games which have, for every player, a strategy set and a preference corre-
spondence constructed by using the utility functions. Nash’s equilibrium
point is seen in this framework as a maximal element. We also consider dif-
ferent types of majorized correspondences, which generalize the well-known
semicontinuous ones. So, we work with U-majorized correspondences de-
fined by Yuan and Tarafdar [20], Qθ−majorized correspondences introduced
by Liu and Cai [11] and LS-majorized correspondences due to G. X. Yuan
[19]. We use theorems which prove the existence of maximal elements for
qualitative games having these types of considered correspondences. These
results are due to Ding [7], Liu and Cai [11], and Chang [4].
Our new approach wants to emphasize that the IESDS process leads
to a kind of r´ationalizable´ result in the extended games. By changing the
context, we underline the idea of rationality, obtained in an iterated process
of elimination the unfitted strategies. We want to highlight the concept,
rather than the context where it was initially defined. We introduce several
types of dominance relation and game reduction and establish conditions
under which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists. In this way,
we generalize, some results due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and Apt [1].
On the other hand, the examples of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] involve
games with discontinuous utility functions and this fact gives us the idea
that the problem of order independence can be raised for qualitative games,
which can also be generalizations of discontinuous strategic games.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains prelim-
inaries concerning topological properties of correspondences and qualitative
games. The main results are presented in Section 3, after the subsections
containing the introduction of definitions, the problem of game reduction
and order independence and the conditions under which order independence
2
is obtained. The last subsection is dedicated to proving that the set of maxi-
mal elements is preserved in any game by the process of iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies. Concluding remarks are presented at the
end.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
2.1. TOPOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF CORRESPONDENCES
Throughout this paper, we shall use the following notations and defini-
tions:
Let A be a subset of a topological space X . 2A denotes the family of
all subsets of A. cl A denotes the closure of A in X . If A is a subset
of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of A. If F , T : A → 2X are
correspondences, then coT , cl T , T ∩F : A→ 2X are correspondences defined
by (coT )(x) =coT (x), (clT )(x) =clT (x) and (T ∩ F )(x) = T (x) ∩ F (x) for
each x ∈ A, respectively. The graph of T : X → 2Y is the set Gr(T ) =
{(x, y) ∈ X × Y | y ∈ T (x)}
We present the notion of a compactly open (compactly closed) set, intro-
duced by Ding [6].
Definition 1. (Ding, [6]) A nonempty subset D of a topological space X
is said to be compactly open (respectively, compactly closed), if for every
nonempty compact subset C of X, D ∩ C is open (respectively, compactly
closed) in C. The compact interior of D is defined by cintD ={G : G ⊆ D
and G is compactly open in X}. It is easy to see that cintD is a compactly
open set in X and for each nonempty compact subset C of X with D∩C = ∅,
we have (cintD)∩C =intC(D ∩C), where intC(D ∩C) denotes the interior
of D ∩ C in C. It is clear that a subset D of X is compactly open in X if
and only if cintD = D.
Several classical types of continuity for correspondences are given.
DEFINITION 1. Let X , Y be topological spaces and T : X → 2Y be a
correspondence
1. T is said to be upper semicontinuous if, for each x ∈ X and each open
set V in Y with T (x) ⊂ V , there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X
such that T (y) ⊂ V for each y ∈ U .
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2. T is said to be lower semicontinuous if, for each x∈ X and each open
set V in Y with T (x) ∩ V 6= ∅, there exists an open neighborhood U of x in
X such that T (y) ∩ V 6= ∅ for each y ∈ U .
3. T is said to have open lower sections if T−1(y) := {x ∈ X : y ∈ T (x)}
is open in X for each y ∈ Y.
2.2. QUALITATIVE GAMES
Let I be a non-empty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let Gi
be a non-empty topological vector space representing the set of actions, let
Pi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi be the preference correspondence and ui :
∏
i∈I Gi → R
be the utility function.
Notation. For each i ∈ I, let us denote G−i :=
∏
j∈I\{i}Gj . If x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi,
we denote x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ...) ∈ G−i. If xi ∈ Gi and x−i ∈ G−i, we
shall use the notation (xi, x−i) = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ...) = x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi.
Definition 2. (Nash, [14]) The family Γ = (Gi, ui)i∈I is said to be a strategic
game.
Definition 3. (Nash, [14]) An equilibrium for Γ is defined as a point x∗ ∈∏
i∈I Gi such that for each i ∈ I, ui(x
∗) ≥ ui(xi, x
∗
−i) for each xi ∈ Gi.
Definition 4. The family G = (Gi, Pi)i∈I is said to be a qualitative game.
Definition 5. A maximal element for G is defined as a point x∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi
such that for each i ∈ I, Pi(x
∗) = ∅.
A qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi)i∈I generalizes a strategic game Γ =
(Gi, ui)i∈I by defining
Pi(x) = {yi ∈ Gi : ui(yi, x−i) > ui(x, x−i)}.
Example 1. Let Γ = (Gi, ui)i∈I be a strategic game, I = {1, 2}, G1 = G2 =
[0, 1], ui(x1, x2) = xi i = 1, 2. The point x
∗ = (1, 1) is Nash equilibrium.
The qualitative game corresponding to Γ is G = (Gi, Pi)i∈I , where
P1(x1, x2) = {y1 ∈ [0, 1] : u1(y1, x2) > u1(x1, x2)} = (x1, 1] if x1 ∈ [0, 1)
and x2 ∈ [0, 1] and
P1(1, x2) = ∅ if x2 ∈ [0, 1];
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P2(x1, x2) = {y2 ∈ [0, 1] : u2(x1, y2) > u2(x1, x2)} = (x2, 1] if x1 ∈ [0, 1]
and x2 ∈ [0, 1) and
P2(x1, 1) = ∅ if x1 ∈ [0, 1];
(x1, x2) = (1, 1) is a maximal element: P1(1, 1) = P2(1, 1) = ∅.
Now we define a transitivity type of correspondences.
Definition 6. Let
∏
i∈I Gi be a product space and let P :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi be
a correspondence. We say that P has the property T if yi ∈ P (x) implies
clP (yi, x−i) ⊂ P (x).
Example 2. P1 and P2 from Example 1 have the property T :
if y1 ∈ P1(x), then y1 ∈ (x1, 1] and clP1(y1, x2) = [y1, 1] ⊂ (x1, 1]
Definition 7. Let
∏
i∈I Gi be a product space and let P,Q :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi
be correspondences. We say that the pair (P,Q) has the property T if for
each x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi, P (x) ⊂ Q(x) and yi ∈ P (x) implies Q(yi, x−i) ⊂ P (x).
Example 3. If we take Q =clP in Example 2, we obtain that the pair (P,Q)
has the property T.
Example 4. Let P,Q : [0, 2]× [0, 2]→ 2[0,2] be defined by
P (x1, x2) =
{
(1, x2] if x1 ∈ [0, 1] and x2 ∈ (1, 2];
∅ otherwise
and
Q(x1, x2) =


[x1, x2] if 0 ≤ x1 < x2 ≤ 2;
[x2, x1] if 0 ≤ x2 < x1 ≤ 2;
{x1} if 0 ≤ x1 = x2 ≤ 2.
We have that P (x1, x2) ⊂ Q(x1, x2) for each (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 2] × [0, 2] and
if y ∈ P (x1, x2), it follows that x1 ∈ [0, 1], x2 ∈ (1, 2] and y ∈ (1, x2] which
implies Q(y, x2) = [y, x2] ⊂ (1, x2] = P (x1, x2).
We note that x1 ∈ Q(x1, x2) for each (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 2] × [0, 2] and Q
has convex closed values, so that Q verifies the assumptions stated in the
hypothesis of the theorems from Section 3.4
We introduce the following class of games.
Let I be a non-empty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let Gi be
a non-empty topological vector space representing the set of actions, and let
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi be correspondences (Pi is the preference correspon-
dence).
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Definition 8. The family G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I is said to be a general quali-
tative game with property T if for each i ∈ I, the pair (Pi, Qi) satisfies the
property T..
Definition 9. A maximal element for the general qualitative game G is de-
fined as a point x∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi such that for each i ∈ I, Pi(x
∗) = ∅.
3. GAME REDUCTION
3.1. DEFINITIONS
This subsection gives preliminary definitions on parings and strict domi-
nance for qualitative games.
We introduce a relation of strict dominance for the qualitative games,
which generalizes the notion of dominance due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman
[8].
Definition 10. A paring of G = (Gi, Pi)i∈I is H = (Hi, Pi|
∏
i∈I
Hi
)i∈I , where
Hi ⊆ Gi.
Definition 11. Given a pairing H of G, the strict dominance relation ≻H
on Gi can be defined:
for xi, yi ∈ Gi, yi ≻H xi ifH−i 6= ∅ and yi ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ H−i,
which is equivalent with H−i 6= ∅ and yi ∈ ∩x−i∈H−iPi(xi, x−i).
Let us consider parings G,H with the property that Hi ⊆ Gi for each
i ∈ I.We generalize, for qualitative games, the types of game reduction used
by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8], in the following way.
Definition 12. i) We define the reduction G → H if for each xi ∈ Gi\Hi,
∩x−i∈G−iPi(xi, x−i) 6= ∅.
ii) the reduction G→ H is called fast if ∩x−i∈G−iPi(xi, x−i) 6= ∅ for some
xi ∈ Gi implies xi /∈ Hi.
iii) the reduction G→∗ H is defined by the existence of (finite or count-
able infinite) sequence of parings Rt of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that R0 = G,
Rt → Rt+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tR
t
i for each i ∈ I;
iv)H is said to be a maximal (→∗)-reduction of G if G→∗ H andH → H ′
only for H = H ′.
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Now, we consider the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
which involves elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by a
strategy from the currently considered game H and not the initial game
G. We study the reductions of qualitative games in the form below and we
introduce the next definition which generalizes the one of Gilboa, Kalai and
Zemel [9] for qualitative games.
Definition 13. We say that G′ = (H1, ..., Hn, P
′
1, ...P
′
n) is a restriction of
a game G = (G1, ...Gn, P1, ...Pn) if each Hi is a (possibly empty) subset of
Xi and P
′
i = (Pi ∩ Hi)|
∏
n
i=1
Hi
. If all Hi are empty, we call H an empty
restriction.
Definition 14. i) We define the reduction G ⇒ H if for each xi ∈ Gi\Hi,
∩x−i∈H−iPi(xi, x−i) ∩Hi 6= ∅.
ii) the reduction G ⇒ H is called fast if ∩x−i∈H−iPi(xi, x−i) ∩ Hi 6= ∅
implies xi /∈ Hi.
iii) the reduction G⇒∗ H is defined by the existence of (finite or count-
ably infinite) sequence of parings Rt of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that R0 = G,
Rt → Rt+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tR
t
i for each i ∈ I;
iv)H is said to be a maximal (⇒∗)-reduction of G if G⇒∗ H andH ⇒ H ′
only for H = H ′.
We further generalize the definition considered by Milgrom and Roberts
[13].
Definition 15. i) We define the reduction G֌ H if for each xi ∈ Gi\Hi,
∩x−i∈H−iPi(xi, x−i) 6= ∅.
ii) the reduction G֌ H is called fast if ∩x−i∈H−iPi(xi, x−i) 6= ∅ implies
xi /∈ Hi.
iii) the reduction G֌∗ H is defined by the existence of (finite or count-
able infinite) sequence of parings Rt of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that R0 = G,
Rt֌ Rt+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tR
t
i for each i ∈ I;
iv) H is said to be a maximal (֌∗)-reduction of G if G ֌∗ H and
H ֌ H ′ only for H = H ′.
We have the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. If we have G֌∗ H and G⇒∗ H ′ maximal reductions such that
Hi, H
′
i 6= ∅ for each i ∈ I, then, Hi ⊆ H
′
i for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let us assume that the reduction G ֌∗ H is defined by the
existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings Rt of G, t =
0, 1, 2..., such that R0 = G, Rt ֌ Rt+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tR
t
i
for each i ∈ I. Assume also that the reduction G ⇒∗ H ′ is defined by the
existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings R′t of G, t =
0, 1, 2..., such that R′0 = G, R′t → R′t+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and H ′i = ∩tR
′t
i
for each i ∈ I.
Since for each t, the reductions Rt֌ Rt+1 and R′t → R′t+1 are fast, then,
for each t, Rt ⊆ R′t.
We prove the last assertion by induction. Suppose the claim holds for all
t ≤ T and consider the induction step for T + 1. Let i ∈ I be fixed and let
xi ∈ R
T+1
i . Then, xi ∈ R
T
i ⊆ R
′T
i and ∩x−i∈RT−iPi(xi, x−i) = ∅. Since R
T ⊆
R′T , we have that ∩x−i∈R′T−iPi(xi, x−i) = ∅ and ∩x−i∈R′T−iPi(xi, x−i)∩R
′T+1
i =
∅. Consequently, ∩x−i∈R′T+1−i
Pi(xi, x−i) ∩ R
′T+1
i = ∅. Hence, xi ∈ R
′T+1
i and
RT+1i ⊆ R
′T+1
i .
Therefore, ∩tR
t
i ⊆ ∩tR
′t
i for each i ∈ I, that is Hi ⊆ H
′
i for each i ∈ I. 
3.2. THE PROBLEM OF GAME REDUCTION AND ORDER INDEPEN-
DENCE
We reconsider the iterative processes in which the dominated strategies
are removed and the limit of this process can be an empty or a nonempty set
of strategies. If, for the case of the strategic games, the remained strategies
are the rationalizable ones, it seems that the process itself deserves to be
studied and leads us to a kind of ´rationalizable´ result, also for the case of
generalized games. In order to better understand the problem and motivate
our demarche, we give several examples.
We first consider example 1 due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and its
generalization.
Example 5. Let I = {1, 2}, X1 = X2 = [0, 1], ui : Gi ×Gj → R, where for
each i ∈ {1, 2}, ui is defined in the following way
ui(x, y) = x if x ∈ [0, 1) and y ∈ [0, 1];
ui(1, y) = 0 if y ∈ [0, 1);
ui(1, 1) = 1.
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Then,
P1(x, y) = {x1 ∈ [0, 1] : u1(x1, y) > u1(x, y)} = (x, 1] if x ∈ [0, 1),
y ∈ [0, 1];
P1(1, y) = {x1 ∈ [0, 1] : u1(x1, y) > u1(1, y)} = [0, 1) if y ∈ [0, 1);
P1(1, 1) = {x1 ∈ [0, 1] : u1(x, 1) > u1(1, 1)} = ∅.
P2(x, y) = {y1 ∈ [0, 1] : u2(x, y2) > u2(x, y)} = (y, 1] if y ∈ [0, 1), x ∈
[0, 1];
P2(x, 1) = {y2 ∈ [0, 1] : u2(x, y2) > u2(x, 1)} = [0, 1) if x ∈ [0, 1);
P2(1, 1) = {y2 ∈ [0, 1] : u2(1, y) > u2(1, 1)} = ∅.
By eliminating Xi\{1, x} for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ [0, 1), we have that
H1 = H2 = {1, x}
P1(1, 1) = ∅; P1(1, x) = [0, 1); P1(x, 1) = (x, 1] and P1(x, x) = (x, 1];
P2(1, 1) = ∅; P2(x, 1) = [0, 1); P2(1, x) = (x, 1] and P2(x, x) = (x, 1].
This game can not be → reduced. In this case, since x is arbitrary, the
IESDS procedure is an order dependent one.
Example 6. We consider the game from example 2.
If Hi = {xi} i ∈ {1, 2}, then P
′
1(x) = P1(x) ∩ {x1} = (x1, 1] ∩ {x1} = ∅;
P ′2(x) = P2(x) ∩ {x2} = (x2, 1] ∩ {x2} = ∅.
It follows that (x1, x2) is a maximal element for the⇒
∗reduced game and
that it is not a maximal element for the initial game.
The example of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] involves games with discon-
tinuous utility functions. These authors let an open problem for researcers
to find classes of games for which order independence holds. As it can be
seen in this subsection, the problem of the existence of nonempty maximal
reductions can be reconsidered for qualitative games, which can also be gen-
eralizations of discontinuous strategic games. The aim of this paper is mainly
to generalize the results obtained by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and Apt
[1].
3.3. CONDITIONS C(t) AND D(t)
Let us consider a game reduction from G to H , defined by a finite or
countable infinite sequence of parings Rt of G.
We generalize the property C(t) proposed by Apt [1]. It refers to the
fact that every strictly dominated strategy on each Rt has an undominated
dominator.
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Definition 16. We call Condition C(t) the following property of the initial
game: for all i ∈ I,
∀ xi ∈ Gi, (∃ yi ∈ Gi, yi ≻Rt xi ⇒ ∃x
∗
i ∈ Gi ( x
∗
i ≻Rt xi ∧ ∄ yi ∈ Gi,
yi ≻Rt x
∗
i )
which is equivalent with
∀ xi ∈ Gi, R
t
−i 6= ∅ and ∃ yi ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ R
t
−i ⇒ ∃x
∗
i ∈ Gi such
that x∗i ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ R
t
−i and ∩x−i∈Rt−iPi(x
∗
i , x−i) = ∅.
Remark 1. For H = G, we obtain the following:
for all i ∈ I,
∀ xi ∈ Gi, (∃ yi ∈ Gi, yi ≻Gi xi ⇒ ∃x
∗
i ∈ Gi ( x
∗
i ≻Gi xi ∧ ∄ yi ∈ Gi,
yi ≻Gi x
∗
i ).
The next property concerns the strict dominance in the reduction Rt. It
is also an extension of Condition D(t) considered by Apt [1].
Definition 17. Condition D(t) states that each strategy xi strictly domi-
nated in Rt is strictly dominated in Rt by some strategy in Rt. Formally, we
can write that for all i ∈ I :
∀ xi ∈ Gi, (∃ yi ∈ Gi, yi ≻Rt xi ⇒ ∃x
∗
i ∈ R
t
i x
∗
i ≻Rt xi)
which is equivalent with
∀ xi ∈ Gi, R
t
−i 6= ∅ and ∩x−i∈Rt−iPi(xi, x−i) 6= ∅ ⇒ ∩x−i∈Rt−iPi(xi, x−i) ∩
Rti 6= ∅.
The next lemma states the relation between the two properties introduced
above.
Lemma 2. For each t, the property C(t) implies the property D(t).
Proof. Let us consider i ∈ I. Assume that xi ∈ Gi, x
′
i ∈ Gi, x
′
i ∈
Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ R
t
−i. The Condition C(t) implies that there exists x
∗
i ∈ Gi
such that x∗i ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ R
t
i and ∩x−i∈Rt−iPi(x
∗
i , x−i) = ∅. For each
s ≤ t, Rti ⊆ R
s
i , then for each s ≤ t, ∩x−i∈Rs−iPi(x
∗
i , x−i) = ∅. It follows that
x∗i is a strategy of player i in all restrictions R
s for s ≤ t, that is x∗i ∈ ∩s≤tR
s
i .
Hence, x∗i ∈ R
t
i and we can conclude that x
∗
i ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∩ R
t
i ∀x−i ∈ R
t
−i.

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Theorem 3. If the property D(t) is fulfilled for each t, then a non-empty
maximal (→∗) reduction of G is the unique maximal (→∗) reduction of G, if
the maximal reduction is defined by a finite sequence of parings.
Proof. Let M and M ′ be maximal (→∗)− reductions of G, M being
nonempty. Let us consider G→∗ M ′ and Rt, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T0 be the implied
finite sequence of parings. If Mi * M ′i for some i, it follows that Mi * R
t
i,
∀t > T for the largest T such that RT+1i is well-defined and Mi ⊆ R
T
i ∀i ∈ I.
Let us take xi ∈ Mi\R
T+1
i for an i fixed. We have that xi ∈ R
T
i \R
T+1
i ,
so that there exists yi ∈ R
T
i such that yi ∈ ∩x−i∈RTi Pi(xi, x−i). Since, in
addition, ∅ 6=Mi ⊆ R
T
i for each i ∈ I, it follows that yi ∈ ∩x−i∈RTi Pi(xi, x−i).
Let M = RT0 . According to property D(T0), there exists z
∗
i ∈ Mi such that
z∗i ∈ ∩x−i∈M−iPi(xi, x−i), which contradicts the fact that M is a maximal
(→∗)−reduction. It remains that Mi ⊆ M
′
i for each i ∈ I and therefore M
′
is nonempty. We can prove in the same way that M ′i ⊆ Mi for each i ∈ I,
implying M =M ′. 
The next theorem states the relation between (֌∗) and (⇒∗)− reductions
of a game.
Theorem 4. Assume that the reduction G֌∗ H is defined by the existence
of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings Rt of G, t = 0, 1, 2...,
and the reduction G⇒∗ H ′ is defined by the existence of (finite or countable
infinite) sequence of parings R′t of G, t = 0, 1, 2...
Assume that property D(s) holds for each s < t. Then, Rt = R′t. In
particular, if D(t) holds for each t, then, H = H ′; then, G has a unique
(⇒∗)−maximal reduction, if G has a unique (֌∗)−maximal reduction.
Proof. We will first prove R′ti ⊆ R
t
i by induction. Suppose that D(s) for
each s < t + 1.
Let xi ∈ R
′t+1
i . Since R
′t → R′t+1 is fast, xi ∈ R
′t and ∄x′i ∈ R
′t
i such that
x′i ≻R′t xi. According to property D(t), ∄x
′
i ∈ Gi such that x
′
i ≻R′t xi. By the
induction hypothesis, R′ti ⊆ R
t
i, therefore, ∄x
′
i ∈ Gi such that x
′
i ≻Rt xi and
xi ∈ R
t
i.We conclude that xi is a strategy in R
t+1
i and then, R
′t+1
i ⊆ R
t+1
i .We
also have from Lemma 1 that Rt+1i ⊆ R
′t+1
i and it follows that R
t+1
i = R
′t+1
i .

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3.4. THE MAIN RESULTS
We state the results concerning the iterated elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies for several classes of qualitative games. The existence and
uniqueness of maximal reductions are proved.
Theorem 4 generalizes Lemma of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] by consid-
ering qualitative games with U−majorized correspondences defined by Yuan
and Tarafdar. A proof of uniqueness of the maximal reduction of G is given
in this case.
We first present the notion of U -majorized correspondence, which gener-
alize the classical upper semicontinuous correspondences.
Definition 18. (Yuan and Tarafdar, [20]). Let X be a topological space and
Y be a non-empty subset of a vector space E, θ : X → E a function and
P : X → 2Y a correspondence.
1) P is of class Uθ (or U) if:
i) for each x ∈ X , θ(x) /∈ P (x) and
ii) P is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values in Y ;
2) A correspondence Px : X → 2
Y is a Uθ-majorant of P at x if there
exists an open neighborhood N(x) of x such that
i) for each z ∈ V (x), P (z) ⊂ Px(z) and θ(z) /∈ Px(z);
ii) Px is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values;
3) P is Uθ−majorized if for each x ∈ X with P (x) 6= ∅, there exists a
U -majorant Px of P at x.
The following theorem is Ding’s result on the existence of maximal ele-
ments of qualitative games. The correspondences are U−majorized.
Theorem 5. (Ding, [7])Let X be a nonempty subset of a Hausdorff locally
convex topological vector space and D a non-empty compact subset of X. Let
P : X → 2D be a U−majorized correspondence. Then, there exists x∗ ∈coD
such that P (x∗) = ∅.
Theorem 6. Let I be a set of players, Gi be a compact convex subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general
qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I which satisfies the property T , where
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi satisfies the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
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i) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
ii) Qi has convex closed values;
iii) Pi(., x−i) is U−majorized on Gi for each x−i ∈ G−i.
Then,
a) If G→∗ H is a game reduction and if there exists yi ≻H xi, for some
xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Hi such that zi ⊁H x
∗
i ≻H xi ∀zi ∈ Gi;
b) a non-empty maximal (→∗) reduction of G is the unique maximal
(→∗) reduction of G.
Proof. a) Let Rt be the sequence of parings of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that
R0 = G, Rt → Rt+1 for each t ≥ 0 andHi = ∩tR
t
i for each i ∈ I. Assume that
there exists yi ≻H xi. Let Zi = ∩x−i∈H−iQ(yi, x−i). According to i), we have
that Zi 6= ∅. The set Zi is convex and closed, so it is compact. Since yi ≻H xi,
we have that H−i 6= ∅. Let x
∗
−i ∈ H−i be fixed and Fi : Zi × {x
∗
−i} → 2
Zi ,
Fi = Pi|Zi×{x∗−i}. According to Ding’s Theorem, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Zi such that
Pi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = ∅.
We have that x∗i ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ H−i. The relation yi ≻H xi
implies that yi ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ H−i and since the pair (Pi, Qi) has the
property T on
∏
i∈I Hi, it follows that x
∗
i ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ H−i.
If there exists zi ∈ Pi(x
∗
i , x−i) ⊂ Qi(x
∗
i , x−i) ∀x−i ∈ H−i, then zi ∈ Zi and
zi ∈ Pi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i), which is a contradiction.
Since H−i ⊆ R
t
−i, ∩x−i∈H−iP (x
∗
i , x−i) = ∅ and then, ∩x−i∈Rt−iP (x
∗
i , x−i) =
∅. We conclude that x∗i ∈ R
t
i ∀t ≥ 0 and x
∗
i ∈ Hi.
b) Let M andM ′ be maximal (→∗)− reductions of G, M being nonempty.
Let us consider G→∗ M ′ and Rt, t=0,1,2..., be the implied finite or infinite
sequence of parings. If Mi *M ′i for some i, it follows that Mi * R
t
i, ∀t > T
for the largest T such that RT+1i is well-defined and Mi ⊆ R
T
i ∀i ∈ I. Let
us take xi ∈ Mi\R
T+1
i for an i fixed. We have that xi ∈ R
T
i \R
T+1
i , so that
there exists yi ∈ R
T
i such that yi ∈ ∩x−i∈RT−iPi(xi, x−i). Since, in addition, ∅ 6=
Mi ⊆ R
T
i for each i ∈ I, it follows that yi ∈ ∩x−i∈M−iPi(xi, x−i). According to
i) there exists z∗i ∈Mi such that z
∗
i ∈ ∩x−i∈M−iPi(xi, x−i), which contradicts
the fact that M is a maximal (→∗)−reduction. It remains that Mi ⊆M
′
i for
each i ∈ I and therefore M ′ is nonempty. We can prove that M ′i ⊆ Mi for
each i ∈ I, implying M =M ′. 
We obtain the following corollary for qualitative games having upper semi-
continuous correspondences Pi, i ∈ I.
Corollary 7. Let I be a set of players, Gi be a compact convex subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general
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qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I which satisfies the property T , where
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi satisfies the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
i) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
ii) Qi has convex closed values;
iii) for each x ∈ Gi, xi /∈ Pi(x) and
iv) Pi is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values in Gi;
Then,
a) If G→∗ H is a game reduction and if there exists yi ≻H xi, for some
xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Hi such that zi ⊁H x
∗
i ≻H xi ∀zi ∈ Gi;
b) a non-empty maximal (→∗) reduction of G is the unique maximal
(→∗) reduction of G.
Liu and Cai [11] defined the correspondences of class Q and the Q-
majorized correspondences.
Definition 19. (Liu and Cai, [11]) Let X be a topological space and Y be a
non-empty subset of a vector space E, θ : X → E a function and P : X → 2Y
a correspondence.
1) P is of class Qθ (or Q) if:
i) for each x ∈ X , θ(x) /∈clP (x) and
ii) P is lower semicontinuous with open and convex values in Y ;
2) A correspondence Px : X → 2
Y is a Qθ-majorant of P at x, if there
exists an open neighborhood N(x) of x such that:
i) for each z ∈ N(x), P (z) ⊂ Px(z) and θ(z) /∈clPx(z);
ii) Px is lower semicontinuous with open convex values;
3) P is Qθ-majorized if for each x ∈ X with P (x) 6= ∅, there exists a
Qθ-majorant Px of P at x.
The next result is also due to Liu and Cai and states the maximal element
existence for qualitative games with Qθ−majorized correspondences.
Theorem 8. (Liu, Cai, [11]). Let X be a convex paracompact subset of
a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E, let D be a nonempty
compact metrizable subset of X. Let P : X → 2D be a Qθ−majorized corre-
spondence. Then, there exists x∗ ∈ X such that P (x∗) = ∅.
Theorem 6 concerns the games with Qθ−majorized correspondences.
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Theorem 9. Let I be a set of players, Gi be a compact convex subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general
qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I which satisfies the property T , where
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
i) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
ii) Qi has convex closed values;
iii) Pi(., x−i) is Qθ−majorized on Gi for each x−i ∈ G−i.
Then,
a) If G →∗ H is a a game reduction and if there exists yi ≻H xi, for
some xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Hi such that zi ⊁H x
∗
i ≻H xi
∀zi ∈ Gi;
b) a non-empty maximal →∗reduction of G is the unique maximal reduc-
tion of G.
Since a correspondence of class Q is Q-majorized, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 10. Let I be a set of players, Gi be a compact convex subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general
qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I which satisfies the property T , where
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
i) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
ii) Qi has convex closed values;
iii) for each xi ∈ Gi, xi /∈clPi(x) and
iv) Pi is lower semicontinuous with open and convex values in Gi;
Then,
a) If G →∗ H is a a game reduction and if there exists yi ≻H xi, for
some xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Hi such that zi ⊁H x
∗
i ≻H xi
∀zi ∈ Gi;
b) a non-empty maximal →∗reduction of G is the unique maximal reduc-
tion of G.
We present here the notion of LS−majorized correspondence.
Let X be a topological space and I be an index set. For each i ∈ I,
let Yi be a non-empty convex subset of a topological vector space Ei. Let
Y =
∏
i∈I
Yi and S : Y → X be a function. For each i ∈ I, let Pi : X → 2
Yi be
a correspondence.
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Definition 20. (Yuan, [19]). Pi is said to be:
1) of class LS if:
i) Pi has convex values;
ii) yi /∈ Pi(S(y)) for each y ∈ Y , and
iii) P−1i (yi) = {x ∈ X : yi ∈ Pi(x)} is open in X for each yi ∈ Yi.
2) LS-majorized if for each x ∈ X, there exists an open neighborhood
N(x) of x in X and a correspondence with convex values Bx : X → 2
Yi such
that:
i) Pi(z) ⊂ Bx(z) for each z ∈ N(x);
ii) yi /∈ Bx(S(y)) for each y ∈ Y and
iii) B−1x (yi) is open in X for each yi ∈ Yi.
We also have the following theorem due to Chang [4] on non-compact
spaces.
Theorem 11. (Chang, [4]) Let X be a convex subset of a Hausdorff topolog-
ical vector space E and let P : X → 2X be a LS−majorized correspondence.
Suppose that there exists a compact set D in X such that, for each finite
subset S of X, there exists a convex compact set K, which contains S and
which satisfies K\ ∪x∈K P
−1(x) ⊂ D. Then, there exists x∗ ∈ D such that
P (x∗) = ∅.
The following result is a consequence of Chang’s Theorem.
Theorem 12. Let I be a set of players, Gi be a compact convex subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general
qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I , which satisfies the property T, where
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
i) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
ii) Qi has convex closed values;
iii) Pi(., x−i) is LS−majorized on Gi for each x−i ∈ G−i.
Then,
a) If G →∗ H is a a game reduction and if there exists yi ≻H xi, for
some xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Hi such that zi ⊁H x
∗
i ≻H xi
∀zi ∈ Gi;
b) a non-empty maximal →∗reduction of G is the unique maximal reduc-
tion of G.
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Since a correspondence of class L is LS-majorized, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 13. Let I be a set of players, Gi be a compact convex subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general
qualitative game G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I , which satisfies the property T, where
Pi, Qi :
∏
i∈I Gi → 2
Gi satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
i) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
ii) Qi has convex closed values;
iii) Pi has convex values;
iv) xi /∈ Pi(x) for each x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi;
v) P−1i (yi) = {x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi : yi ∈ Pi(x)} is open in
∏
i∈I Gi for each
yi ∈ Gi.
Then,
a) If G →∗ H is a a game reduction and if there exists yi ≻H xi, for
some xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Hi such that zi ⊁H x
∗
i ≻H xi
∀zi ∈ Gi;
b) a non-empty maximal →∗reduction of G is the unique maximal reduc-
tion of G.
Remark 2. For H = G, we obtain that under the conditions of Corollary 3,
we have the following:
if there exists yi ≻G xi, for some xi, yi ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, there exists x
∗
i ∈ Gi
such that zi ⊁G x∗i ≻G xi ∀zi ∈ Gi;
The next theorem is a generalization of Theorem 1 of Dufwenberg and
Stegeman [8] for the class of qualitative games.
Theorem 14. Let G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I be a general qualitative game, where
for each i ∈ I, Gi is a non-empty compact subset of a Hausdorff topological
vector space and Pi :
∏
i∈I Gi such that:
i) Pi has compactly open lower sections and convex values;
ii) xi /∈ Pi(x) ∀x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi;
iii) yi ∈ Qi(yi, x−i) for each x−i ∈ G−i;
iv) Qi has convex closed values;
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Then, G has a unique maximal →∗reduction M. Further, ∀i ∈ I, Mi is
nonempty, compact and Pi|M has compactly open lower sections.
Proof. We will prove further that G has a nonempty maximal reduc-
tion.The proof of its uniqueness is a consequence of Corollary 3.
1) We first establish that if G → H is fast and H is compact, Hi is
compact and nonempty. Choose i such that Hi 6= Gi. Then, yi ≻G x for
some x, y ∈ Gi and then the set Hi is nonempty.
We will prove that Hi is compact. Let yi ∈ Hi and Z(yi) = CXP
−1
i (yi),
where X =
∏
i∈I Gi. According to the assumption ii), Z(yi) 6= ∅ and ac-
cording to i), Z(yi) is closed in the compact set
∏
i∈I Gi, and therefore it is
compact.
Define Zi(yi) :=priZ(yi). We have that Z(yi) is a non-empty closed set in
Gi with yi ∈ Zi(yi).
Now, we prove that Hi = ∩yi∈HiZi(yi). In order to show that Hi ⊆
∩yi∈HiZi(yi), we consider zi ∈ Gi. If for every yi ∈ Hi, zi /∈ Z(yi), it follows
that yi ∈ Pi(zi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ G−i, then zi /∈ Hi and therefore CGi(∩yi∈HiZi(yi)) ⊂
CGiHi, which impliesHi ⊆ ∩yi∈HiZi(yi). Now, we want to show that ∩yi∈HiZi(yi) ⊂
Hi, that is CGiHi ⊆ CGi(∩yi∈HiZi(yi)).
If zi /∈ Hi, then there exists xi ∈ Gi such that xi ∈ Pi(zi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ G−i.
According to Remark 2, there exists x∗i ∈ Gi such that x
∗
i ∈ Pi(zi, x−i)
∀x−i ∈ G−i. It follows that zi /∈ Zi(x
∗
i ), therefore zi /∈ ∩yi∈XiZi(yi), and,
hence, CGiHi ⊆ CGi(∩yi∈HiZi(yi)). Since Hi = ∩yi∈YiZi(yi), Hi is closed in
Gi and compact.
2) Let Rt, t = 0, 1, ... denote the unique sequence of games of G such that
R0 = G and Rt → Rt+1 is fast ∀t. Result 1 implies that Rt is compact and
nonempty ∀t, so that Mi = ∩tR
t
i is compact and nonempty. According to
i), it follows that P−1i (yi) is open in Mi. We still have to show that M is a
maximal →∗reduction of G.
Let’s consider i ∈ I and xi ∈Mi. We will prove that xi is not dominated
by any yi ∈ Mi. Let yi ∈ Mi,and let A = CX−iB, where B = {x−i ∈ G−i :
yi ∈ Pi(xi, x−i)}. Then A = CX−i{x−i ∈ X−i : (xi, x−i) ∈ P
−1
i (yi)}.
If A ∩ Rt−i = ∅ for every t such that R
t 6= M, then yi ∈ Pi(xi, x−i) for
each x−i ∈ R
t
−i, that is yi ≻Rt xi , which contradicts xi ∈ Mi. Therefore
A ∩ Rt−i is nonempty and compact for every t, such that R
t 6= M. This fact
implies A ∩M−i is nonempty and then, yi /∈ Pi(xi, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ M−i, that is
yi ⊁M xi. 
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3.5. MAXIMAL ELEMENTS FOR QUALITATIVE GAMES
This subsection is meant to prove that the set of maximal elements is
preserved in any game by the process of iterated elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies.
Theorem 15. Let G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I be a general qualitative game which
satisfies property T and xi /∈ Pi(xi, x−i) for each x−i ∈
∏
i∈I Gi. Let us
assume that for each x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi, there exists z
∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi such that z
∗
i ∈
Qi(zi, x−i) for all z ∈
∏
i∈I Gi and i ∈ I. If H is a (⇒
∗)−reduction of G,
then games G and H have the same maximal elements.
Proof. Let Rt, t = 0, 1, ... denote the unique sequence of games of G such
that R0 = G, Rt ⇒ Rt+1 is fast ∀t andHi = ∩tR
t
i for each i ∈ I. Suppose that
x∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi is a maximal element in the gameG, that is Pi(x
∗) = ∅ and then,
x∗i is never eliminated in the sequence R
t ∀i ∈ I. It follows that x∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Hi,
so that P
i|
∏
i∈I
Hi
(x∗) = ∅ and, therefore, P
i|
∏
i∈I
Hi
(x∗) ∩ Hi = ∅ and x is
also a maximal element in game H.
Conversely, let x∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Hi be a maximal element in game H (Pi(x
∗) ∩
Hi = ∅ for each i ∈ I) and consider z
∗ as in the hypothesis: z∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi such
that z∗i ∈ Qi(z, x
∗
−i) for all z ∈
∏
i∈I Gi. We will prove that Pi(z
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = ∅.
If we assume, on the contrary, that there exists x′i ∈ Pi(z
∗
i , x
∗
−i), it follows,
according to property T, Qi(x
′
i, x
∗
−i) ⊂ Pi(z
∗
i , x
∗
−i). However, z
∗
i ∈ Qi(z, x
∗
−i)
for all z ∈
∏
i∈I Gi, particularly z
∗
i ∈ Qi(x
′
i, x
∗
−i)and then, z
∗
i ∈ Pi(z
∗
i , x
∗
−i),
which contradicts the hypothesis. Since Pi(z
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = ∅, z
∗
i is never eliminated
in the sequence Rt ∀i ∈ I, and z∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Hi. The last assertion implies
z∗i ∈ Qi(zi, x
∗
−i) ∩ Hi for all z ∈
∏
i∈I Gi. We will prove that Pi(x
∗) = ∅.
Let us assume, on the contrary, that there exists x′ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi such that
x′i ∈ Pi(x
∗) for each i ∈ I. Then, according to Property T, we have that
Qi(x
′
i, x
∗
−i) ⊂ Pi(x
∗). However, we have that z∗i ∈ Qi(x
′
i, x−i) from hypothesis,
so that z∗i ∈ Pi(x
∗). In addition, z∗i ∈ Hi and, then, z
∗
i ∈ Pi(x
∗) ∩Hi, which
contradicts the fact that Pi(x
∗) ∩Hi = ∅. In conclusion, Pi(x
∗) must be the
empty set and x∗ is a maximal element for game G. 
For the (→∗)−reductions of a game, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 16. Let G = (Gi, Pi, Qi)i∈I be a general qualitative game which
satisfies property T and xi /∈ Pi(xi, x−i) for each x−i ∈
∏
i∈I Gi. Let us
assume that for each x ∈
∏
i∈I Gi, there exists z
∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi such that z
∗
i ∈
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Qi(zi, x−i) for all z ∈
∏
i∈I Gi and i ∈ I. If H is a (→
∗)−reduction of G,
then games G and H have the same maximal elements.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] let an open problem for researchers, that is
to find classes of games for which order independence holds. We reconsidered
the problem of the existence of nonempty maximal reductions for qualitative
games, which can be generalizations of discontinuous strategic games. We
generalized the results obtained by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and Apt
[1].
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